Har islamister från Muslimska brödraskapet infiltrerat det svenska samhället?
På fredag 10/2 försvarar Sameh Egyptson sin doktorsavhandling vid Lunds universitet. En 740-sidig anklagelseakt mot namngivna muslimska ledare – och mot Sverige.
Men de utpekade har hittat sakfel. Handledaren spår ”en skitstorm” och är beredd att hamna i domstol.
https://www.dn.se/sverige/storbrak-vantas-kring-avhandling-om-muslimska-brodraskapet-i-sverige/
Mayors, deputy mayors, councillors, and policy officers from members of the Intercultural Cities network have been invited to apply for the training course on “Communication and media training for mayors: promoting intercultural narratives in difficult times” which will take place on 27-28 October 2022 in Strasbourg, France.
Migration and diversity are key parts of the public debate in Europe on culture, social cohesion, and identity. These topics stir emotions and attract political controversy with equal measure, presenting those who see strength in the inclusive and intercultural future of cities with unique challenges.
Communicating the positive vision of intercultural cities, while strengthening community trust and promoting solidarity, requires a media skill-set that combines engaging, optimistic, and timely messaging.
This two-day course aims to provide the participants with the tools, techniques, and confidence to carry out effective media interviews (TV, radio or print) regardless of the media scenario or the circumstances. Participants will also learn how to promote effective messages, narratives, and stories about intercultural integration, thereby helping to create and promote the very best of intercultural cities around the world. The training will also cover good practices from other cities and techniques on how to deal with potential backlash and hate speech.
For more information: Council of Europe
Ladda ner rapporten (pdf, 727.8 kB)
978-91-88943-61-3
Denna forskningsöversikt sammanfattar forskningsläget om integration och utbildning i Sverige under perioden 2010–2021. Den bygger på ett omfattande material bestående av publicerad forskning inom utbildningsområdet.
Forskningsöversikten vänder sig till skolpersonal, lokala beslutsfattare, rektorer, lärare och annan skolpersonal samt till lokala beslutsfattare och andra som är intresserade av integration inom utbildningsområdet.
Frågeställningarna som översikten tar upp är:
Forskningsöversikten är framtagen inom det nationella forskningsprogrammet inom migration och integration.
Upploppen skedde i bland annat Linköping, Norrköping och Örebro i samband med att den danske politikern Rasmus Paludan ansökt om tillstånd för att bränna Koranen under ett antal manifestationer.
Riksdagen anser att den utredning som Polismyndigheten tillsatt inte är tillräcklig. Både regeringen och Polismyndigheten kommer att behöva granskas och där har en oberoende granskningskommission helt andra möjligheter till självständig granskning. Därför menar riksdagen att en sådan oberoende kommission ska granska agerandet på ett antal punkter.
Tillkännagivandet har sin grund i ett så kallat utskottsinitiativ. Det betyder att förslaget har väckts i utskottet och inte bygger på ett regeringsförslag eller en riksdagsmotion som annars är det vanliga.
Mer information här: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/arende/betankande/en-oberoende-utredning-av-de-sk-paskupploppen_H901JuU51
”I svenska anstalter och häkten finns stora grupper av utländska medborgare som saknar anknytning till Sverige. Med de nya reglerna på plats kommer fler domar kunna skickas över till andra medlemsstater, vilket kan antas leda till fler överföranden av dömda personer”, säger justitie- och inrikesminister Morgan Johansson (S), i ett pressmeddelande 9 juni 2022.
Lagändringarna har skickats till lagrådet och föreslås träda i kraft 1 december i år.
Kommentar från Miguel Benito: I gengäld kommer en del svenskar som idag sitter i utländska anstalter till Sverige och fyller de tomma platserna.
Tid: Fredagen den 6 maj klockan 9.
Plats: Kammaren, Allmänhetens entré, Riksgatan 3, Stockholm.
Den särskilda debatten är öppen för allmänhet och media och går att se via riksdagens webb-tv.
Ett parti kan begära att riksdagen i en särskild debatt ska debattera en viss fråga som inte har samband med något ärende. Efter samråd med partiernas gruppledare beslutar talmannen om och när den särskilda debatten ska ske. En företrädare för varje parti har rätt att delta i debatten. Den minister i regeringen som ansvarar för frågan deltar i debatten.
Preliminär talarlista och debattregler
Den särskilda debatten går att se direkt eller i efterhand via riksdagens webb-tv.
För mer information kontakta riksdagsinformation, telefon: 020-349 000, e-post: riksdagsinformation@riksdagen.se.
| Utlänningar ska lämna fingeravtryck och fotograferas vid in- och utresa till Sverige (SfU14) Riksdagen säger ja till regeringens förslag om lagändringar för att anpassa svensk lagstiftning till EU:s nya in- och utresesystem. EU:s in- och utrikessystem innebär att en utlänning från tredje land som vill resa in i Sverige ska lämna fingeravtryck och låta sig bli fotograferad för att en kontroll mot in- och utresesystemet ska kunna göras. Besluten fattas därför med anledning av de två EU-förordningar som antogs 2017. Lagändringarna föreslås börja gälla den dag regeringen bestämmer. |
Ukrainska medborgare är viseringsfria inom Schengenområdet. Det betyder att en ukrainsk medborgare som kan visa upp ett giltigt biometriskt pass vid gränsen till Sverige får stanna här utan visum i upp till 90 dagar.
Läs mer om att vara i Sverige viseringsfritt
Ukrainska medborgare som saknar biometriskt pass har rätt att resa in och vistas i Sverige i 90 dagar med ett Schengenvisum.
EU:s medlemsstater har beslutat om att aktivera massflyktsdirektivet. Det innebär att du som är ukrainsk medborgare eller har skyddsstatus i Ukraina och har lämnat landet efter den ryska invasionen kan få omedelbart skydd i Sverige och ett tidsbegränsat uppehållstillstånd.
Direkt vid ansökan kan du få hjälp med mat och någonstans att bo, om du har ett akut behov av det.
När du har fått ditt tillstånd har du förutom mat och boende rätt att arbeta, rätt att söka grundläggande vård, rätt till skolgång för barn och visst ekonomiskt bistånd i Sverige.
Direktivet gäller
För att omfattas av direktivet ska du ha lämnat landet den 24 februari 2022 eller senare.
Personer som har begått vissa brottsliga handlingar (exempelvis krigsbrott eller annat grovt brott) eller utgör ett hot mot Sveriges säkerhet kan inte få uppehållstillstånd enligt massflyktsdirektivet.
För att ansöka kommer du att behöva registrera dig och visa upp ett biometriskt hemlandspass eller andra ukrainska identitetshandlingar hos Migrationsverket. Du kommer även att få lämna fingeravtryck och fotograferas som en del av registreringsprocessen.
Om du beviljas uppehållstillstånd enligt massflyktsdirektivet gäller ditt tillstånd till den 4 mars 2023. Du får ett uppehållstillståndskort som visar vilken typ av uppehållstillstånd du har. När du har fått ditt uppehållstillstånd har du bland annat rätt att arbeta i Sverige.
Källa: Migrationsverket.
| Origin of World’s Largest Migrant Population, India Seeks to Leverage Immigration With nearly 18 million nationals abroad, India is the origin of more international migrants than any other country and claims the world’s largest diaspora. Indian emigration can be traced back to the colonial era, with the British empire dispatching Indian workers across the globe, and has evolved for more than a century in response to global labor demands and geopolitical events. This article offers a comprehensive profile of migration from and to India. |
| Feature The World Is Witnessing a Rapid Proliferation of Border Walls The number of border walls globally has multiplied at a rapid clip, from fewer than five at the end of World War II to more than six dozen now, with more under construction. Most of the world’s border fortifications have been built since the turn of the millennium, and are intended to accomplish a range of functions. This article charts the remarkable growth and normalization of border walls globally. |
International Centre for Migration Policy Development presents a brief analysis of migration and policy trends.
2022 will be another challenging year for EU migration policy. Below is a non-exhaustive list of trends and developments that will be high on the agenda of decision-makers and analysts alike.
1. The rise in irregular migration to the EU.
Almost 200,000 illegal crossings were recorded at the external borders of the EU in 2021. This corresponds to an increase of 57% in comparison to 2020 and 38% in comparison to 2019, the year before the COVID-19 pandemic struck. Driven by growing instability in major countries of origin and aggravated by the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, this trend is likely to continue in 2022.
2. Shifting pressures on the main migration routes.
In reaction to increasing migration pressures, Greece closed its external borders and temporarily suspended the admission of asylum applications in early 2020. In 2021, it introduced additional measures such as closed and controlled reception structures, wider use of administrative detention or the extension of physical border control facilities and surveillance. Apparently, the strict Greek asylum policy prompted irregular migrants and asylum seekers to switch to alternate routes. This trend is likely to continue in 2022, exacerbating the pressure on reception and migration management
capacities in the Western Balkans and along the Central Mediterranean Route.
3. The migration effects of the Taliban takeover.
The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the rapidly growing humanitarian crisis in the country are likely to lead to additional displacement and outbound flows of refugees and migrants. According to initial assessments, another 500,000 Afghan refugees are expected to flee the country. The countries in the region have closed their borders, limited access to passport and visa holders, and cut support for newly arriving Afghans. These measures are likely to control the size of movements. In the medium to long term, it will be difficult to fully control the vast borders in the region and the activities of the well-established smuggling networks. The increasing numbers of asylum applications lodged by Afghan nationals in the second half of 2021 suggest that the EU will see arrivals increase in 2022 as well.
4. Growing tensions in Libya.
The continued presence of foreign armed forces and tensions over the presidential elections endanger the fragile state of stability in the country. Ongoing disputes about fundamental rules governing elections and uncertainty about when they will be held will also impact migration from and through Libya and Libyan partners’ capacity to cooperate with the EU and the international community on solving migration issues. Coupled with growing instability in sub-Saharan Africa and the political and
economic challenges faced by neighbouring Tunisia, these developments in Libya make it very likely that the scale of irregular migration along the Central Mediterranean Route will remain high or even increase in 2022.
5. The flaring up of the Syrian conflict.
Violence has continued throughout 2021 and hostilities have re-intensified for the first time since the ceasefire agreement of March 2020. The humanitarian situation has significantly worsened. Along with the economic downturn in Turkey, which is the major host of Syrian refugees globally, 2022 is likely to see increased primary and secondary movements of Syrians towards the EU. Already last year, the number of asylum applications lodged by Syrian nationals in an EU Member State was 71% higher than
in 2020 and 46% higher than in 2019.
6. The reorientation of migration flows from Latin America.
In recent years, asylum seekers from Latin American countries, especially Colombia and Venezuela, ranked high in European Union apprehension statistics. In 2020, their number declined. At the time, this change was thought to be the result of the extensive restrictions on air travel from third countries to the EU during the first phase of the pandemic. The gradual lifting of restrictions in 2021, however, did not lead to a resurgence of Latin American asylum migration to the EU. The drop in applications is
believed to be the result of fewer flight connections to Europe and increased movement towards the United States. Envisaged policy changes announced by the new US administration appear to have sparked hopes for a more liberal stance towards migrants and refugees and prompted a reorientation of related flows from European destinations to the US.
7. The continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration.
The pandemic has increased economic pressures on large parts of the overall population in low-income countries but also on the migrant and refugee populations residing within their territories. The resilience of migrant remittances might cushion some of these pressures but surely not all of them. Uneven economic recovery is likely to fuel irregular migration also in 2022. This assumption is supported by developments observed in 2021, such as the increase of irregular flows from North African countries, secondary movements of Syrian and Afghan nationals from Turkey and Iran, or the
sharp increase of irregular arrivals from Latin America at the southern border of the United States. Bangladesh observed a slowing of remittances via official channels in the second half of 2021, as migration ramped up again and informal funds transfer systems gained in importance again.
8. The EU response to the instrumentalisation of irregular migrants.
The instrumentalisation of migration is not a new phenomenon. Countries in the neighbourhood have pressured the EU before to make political or financial concessions in return for cooperation on migration control. The deliberate creation of a migration crisis at the EU’s external borders, however, instigated and controlled by Belarussian authorities, added a dimension different from previous instances. The EU’s swift, unified and robust response in cooperation with non-European partners halted this scheme. But the situation will remain volatile in 2022 and thousands of migrants are left in
a state of limbo, and an immediate threat to their lives and well-being.
9. The presidential elections in France and the French Presidency of the EU.
2022 is a big election year in Europe, all of them important for European migration policymaking. The greatest attention will be paid to the presidential elections in France. Euroscepticism is widespread among the French electorate and the majority of candidates and is linked to a tougher stance on immigration and the wish to repatriate power from the EU to the Member States. The elections will also influence the implementation of the French Presidency programme as it pertains to migration.
The programme focuses on reforming the Schengen Area and continuing the work on asylum and migration. It emphasises the need to better address the instrumentalisation of migration and to prevent irregular migratory flows within the Schengen Area.
10. New accents in Germany’s migration policy.
The new government’s coalition agreement contains an extensive chapter on migration. It calls for a restart of Germany’s migration and integration policy to reflect the stance of a modern immigration country. Amongst other things, the coalition agreement calls for a strengthening reinforcement of functioning partnership agreements with non-EU countries following a holistic approach and including economic cooperation, visa facilitation, skills transfers, job platforms and cooperation on the reintegration of rejected asylum seekers. Moreover, the coalition agreement is committed to
reforming the European asylum system and ensuring a fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity. Thus, Germany seeks to forge a coalition of member states that are receptive to admission.
11. Renewed attempts to address secondary movements.
The issue of secondary movements of asylum seekers among member states has been high on the European agenda for years. In Germany, one priority identified in the coalition agreement of the new government is to prevent the misuse of visa-free travel for secondary movements within the EU. The French Presidency aims at a reform of the Schengen acquis that helps to prevent irregular migratory flows within the Schengen Area. Internal border controls were a much-debated issue in the EU before,
with the European Commission and several member states insisting that such controls must remain the exception. It can be assumed that this debate will continue throughout 2022.
12. Labour shortages and the discussion on legal migration channels.
The European Union has entered a period of demographic ageing. By 2050, the share of the EU population of working age will shrink by 37 million. Already now, many vacancies cannot be filled with domestic applicants and the COVID-19 pandemic has made it all the clearer how much the European economies depend on essential workers. Last year, an apparent shortage of lorry drivers in the UK and other European countries made the headlines, spurring fears of interrupted supply chains and missing deliveries of food, fuel and other essential goods. Current labour shortages might be less severe than
portrayed in the media and much can be done through upskilling, higher wages and better working conditions. But European labour markets will remain tight in 2022 and beyond, intensifying the debate on ways to fill immediate shortages and to cope with long-term labour market demands. This might give renewed impetus to the further development of instruments such as the EU’s Talent Partnerships and to overall cooperation with non-EU countries on labour migration issues.